‘A US Bargaining Chip’ – What Remains of Hamas’ Tunnel Arsenal?

An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)
An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)
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‘A US Bargaining Chip’ – What Remains of Hamas’ Tunnel Arsenal?

An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)
An Israeli soldier inside a Gaza tunnel, November 2023 (Reuters)

Hamas has recently stepped up its release of videos showing Israeli captives held in its tunnel network, along with footage of armed fighters emerging from underground to launch attacks against Israeli forces in areas including Beit Hanoun, Al-Tuffah, and Rafah.

A raid claimed by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' armed wing, on Wednesday in the vicinity of Al-Zahraa Mosque in the Al-Jneina neighborhood of eastern Rafah, has once again spotlighted the group’s use of tunnels—particularly in Rafah, a city Israeli military sources say is now under their full control.

The reappearance of such scenes, nearly a year and a half into Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, has prompted fresh Israeli acknowledgement that Hamas' tunnel infrastructure remains largely intact despite repeated attempts to destroy it.

In April, Israel’s Channel 12 cited Israeli security sources as saying that just 25% of Hamas tunnels had been neutralized. The figures underscore growing Israeli concerns about the resilience and extent of the subterranean system beneath Gaza.

Due to its clandestine nature, estimates of the tunnel network vary widely.

Palestinian sources describe it as a sprawling maze comprising around 1,300 tunnels, plunging as deep as 70 meters underground and stretching some 500 kilometers. Former Israeli National Security Adviser Jacob Nagel estimated in October 2023 that the tunnels could extend for “thousands of kilometers.”

Engineering Feat Involving Thousands

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the recent reactivation of tunnels by the group’s armed wing, the Qassam Brigades, is “natural given the ongoing, though limited, military confrontation in some areas.” They added that tunnel use could expand “as the ground offensive intensifies.”

The sources described the tunnels as a “vital military pillar” and claimed Israel has yet to fully understand their structure. “The network is the product of years of engineering work involving thousands of operatives,” one source said.

While acknowledging that parts of the network were hit during the war, the sources said Hamas has since repaired and reused many of the damaged passages.

“Some tunnels remain undetected, even in areas where the Israeli army operated and destroyed nearby routes,” they said.

They also claimed that guards responsible for Israeli hostages have recently used tunnels to move captives again, particularly after they were temporarily housed in above-ground locations during the last ceasefire.

For over a decade, Israel has waged a persistent campaign to detect and destroy Hamas’ underground tunnel network in Gaza, believing it had neutralized the threat after constructing a fortified barrier and sealing known tunnels with expanding foam.

But recent footage and attacks suggest the tunnels remain a key part of Hamas’ war strategy — and a potential bargaining chip in future negotiations.

In the years following the completion of the Gaza border wall, Israel reduced surveillance around the enclave, withdrawing weapons from nearby communities and dismantling several watchtowers, confident that Hamas’ tunnel ambitions had been thwarted.

Yet Palestinian militants used this lull to expand a vast web of underground passages within Gaza. According to sources familiar with the matter, Hamas constructed tunnels for offensive operations, defensive positions, and command-and-control purposes — some designed to shield senior political and military leaders during conflict.

Tunnels as a Bargaining Tool

Palestinian sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that in past truce negotiations, including US-backed efforts, mediators had called on Hamas to relinquish its military infrastructure, including its tunnels, as part of any disarmament framework.

“The tunnels are seen as a dangerous asset that could allow Hamas to launch new offensives, even years down the line,” one source said, adding that the demand to dismantle them was part of broader demilitarization proposals.

While discussions around the tunnels predated their reemergence in recent videos, Hamas’ renewed use of them has shaken Israeli confidence. Despite conducting sweeping operations across Gaza — including extended searches lasting weeks in some areas — Israeli forces now acknowledge that much of the network remains operational.

Before Israel launched its offensive in Gaza in 2023, Hamas had reportedly maintained tunnels for specific purposes — including ones to shelter its leadership. However, over 18 months of war have degraded the group’s infrastructure.

Multiple key figures were killed in tunnel strikes, including Ahmed Al-Ghandour, commander of Hamas’ northern brigade, and Politburo member Rawhi Mushtaha.

Still, tunnel warfare continues. In cities like Khan Younis, Israeli troops returned to areas previously cleared, only to discover new or rebuilt tunnels. Military tactics and engineering efforts to permanently disable the network have so far yielded limited results.

Hamas sources say the group deliberately withheld some tunnels from use during the war to avoid detection by Israeli combat engineers. Should Israel widen its ground operations, they warn, those hidden passages may soon come into play.

 

 



Iran Leader Khamenei Sees His Inner Circle Hollowed Out by Israel 

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei looks on, in a televised message following the Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei looks on, in a televised message following the Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters
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Iran Leader Khamenei Sees His Inner Circle Hollowed Out by Israel 

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei looks on, in a televised message following the Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei looks on, in a televised message following the Israeli strikes in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via Reuters

Iran's 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei cuts an increasingly lonely figure.

Khamenei has seen his main military and security advisers killed by Israeli air strikes, leaving major holes in his inner circle and raising the risk of strategic errors, according to five people familiar with his decision-making process.

One of those sources, who regularly attends meetings with Khamenei, described the risk of miscalculation to Iran on issues of defense and internal stability as "extremely dangerous".

Several senior military commanders have been killed since Friday including Khamenei's main advisers from the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's elite military force: the Guards' overall commander Hossein Salami, its aerospace chief Amir Ali Hajizadeh who headed Iran's ballistic missile program and spymaster Mohammad Kazemi.

These men were part of the supreme leader's inner circle of roughly 15-20 advisers comprising Guards commanders, clerics, and politicians, according to the sources who including three people who attend or have attended meetings with the leader on major issues and two close to officials who regularly attend.

The loose group meets on an ad-hoc basis, when Khamenei's office reaches out to relevant advisers to gather at his compound in Tehran to discuss an important decision, all the people said. Members are characterized by unwavering loyalty to him and the ideology of the regime, they added.

Khamenei, who was imprisoned before the 1979 revolution and maimed by a bomb attack before becoming leader in 1989, is profoundly committed to maintaining Iran's system of government and deeply mistrustful of the West.

Under Iran's system of government, he has supreme command of the armed forces, the power to declare war, and can appoint or dismiss senior figures including military commanders and judges.

Khamenei makes the final decision on important matters, though he values advice, listens attentively to diverse viewpoints, and often seeks additional information from his counsellors, according to one source who attends meetings.

"Two things you can say about Khamenei: he is extremely stubborn but also extremely cautious. He is very cautious. That is why he has been in power for as long as he has," said Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute think-tank in Washington.

"Khamenei is pretty well placed to do the basic cost-benefit analysis which really fundamentally gets to one issue more important than anything else: regime survival."

KHAMENEI'S SON AT THE FORE

The focus on survival has repeatedly been put to the test. Khamenei has deployed the Revolutionary Guards and its affiliated Basij militia to quell national protests in 1999, 2009 and 2022.

However, while the security forces have always been able to outlast demonstrators and restore state rule, years of Western sanctions have caused widespread economic misery that analysts say could ultimately threaten internal unrest.

The stakes could barely be higher for Khamenei who faces an escalating war with Israel, which has targeted nuclear and military sites and personnel with air attacks, drawing retaliatory Iranian missile fire, insiders and analysts said.

The five people familiar with Khamenei's decision-making process stressed that other insiders who have not been targeted by Israel's strikes remain important and influential, including top advisers on political, economic and diplomatic issues.

Khamenei designates such advisers to handle issues as they arise, extending his reach directly into a wide array of institutions spanning military, security, cultural, political and economic domains, two of the sources said.

Operating this way, including in bodies nominally under the elected president, means Khamenei's office is often involved not only in the biggest questions of state but in executing even minor initiatives, the sources said.

His son Mojtaba has over the past 20 years grown ever more central to this process, the sources said, building a role that cuts between the personalities, factions and organizations involved to coordinate on specific issues, the sources said.

A mid-ranking cleric seen by some insiders as a potential successor to his ageing father, Mojtaba has built close ties with the Guards giving him added leverage within across Iran's political and security apparatus, the sources said.

Ali Asghar Hejazi, the deputy of political security affairs at Khamenei's office, has been involved in sensitive security decisions and is often described as the most powerful intelligence official in Iran, the sources said.

Meanwhile, the head of Khamenei's office, Mohammad Golpayegani, as well as former Iranian foreign ministers Ali Akbar Velayati and Kamal Kharazi, and ex-parliament speaker Ali Larijani, remain trusted confidants on diplomatic and domestic policies issues such as the nuclear dispute, the sources said.

The loss of the Revolutionary Guards commanders nonetheless decimates the top ranks of a military organization that he has put at the center of power since becoming supreme leader in 1989, relying on it for both internal security and Iran's regional strategy.

While the regular army chain of command runs through the defense ministry under the elected president, the Guards answer personally to Khamenei, securing the best military equipment for their land, air and sea branches and giving their commanders a major state role.

As he faces one of the most dangerous moments in the country’s history, Khamenei finds himself further isolated by the recent losses of other key advisers in the region as Iran's "Axis of Resistance" coalition has been hammered by Israel.

Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, who was personally close to the Iranian leader, was killed by an Israeli airstrike in September last year and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was overthrown by opposition factions in December.

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